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COMMENT
QUALIFICATION OF PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING
PLANS UNDER SECTION 165(a) I.R.C.:
THE LINCOLN ELECTRIC CASE
Pension and profit-sharing plans, while not actually new programs,
have reached a position of key importance in the field of labor relations
within a relatively few years. Up-to-date statistics are ilifficult to obtain;
however, it has been estimated* that current corporation outlay for
deferred compensation plans is approximately one and one-half billions
annually.' Prior to the institution of wage-salary stabilization, new
plans were being established at the rate of 100 per month. From 1942
to June 20, 1950, the Bureau of Internal Revenue had ruled on 13,899
pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans as to the requirements
for tax exemption under Section 165 (a) and 23(p) of the Internal
Revenue Code..2
While not solely responsible for the great increase in deferred
compensation systems, doubtless an important factor in their popularity
is the fact that payments to qualified plans are income tax deductions
for the employer. 3 However, any tax saving incentive on the part of
the employer becomes valid only when there are other sound business
reasons for instituting a plan.
A pension plan is established primarily to provide systematically
for the payment of definitely determinable benefits over a period of
years or life after retirement, while a profit-sharing plan, on the other
hand, provides for participation in profits by means of a definite pre-
determined formula for both sharing the profits and distributing the
funds so accumulated to the participants.4
The contributions made by the employer are deductible in the year
made,5 regardless of whether the participant's interests are non-forfeit-
able,6 providing the plan is qualified by meeting the requirements set
1. THE HoWARD E. NYHART Co. PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING BULLETIN (Novem-
ber, 1950).
2. P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERV. 12011 (1951).
3. The employer with high profits, for example, one who is in the 77%/ tax bracket,
pays for the plan with dollars having a value of twenty-three cents.'
4. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.165-1, as amended, T.D. 5422 (Dec. 13, 1944), P-H
PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERV. 9176 (1949); 14021 (1951).
5. However, only within the prescribed limits of INT. REV. CODE § 23(p).
6. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK FOR PENSION PLANNING 69 (1949).
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out in Section 165 (a) 7 as interpreted by the Commissioner. s  The
funds accruing to the benefit of the employee under a qualified plan are
taxable to the employee when the amount is distributed or made available
rather than at the time of the employer's contribution and deduction.9
This means that the benefits will generally be paid to the participant on
7. INT. REV. CODE § 165, EMPLOYEES' TRUSTS.
(a) Exemption from Tax.-A trust forming part of a stock bonus, pension, or
profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their
beneficiaries shall not be taxable under this supplement and no other provision of this
supplement shall apply with respect to such trust or to its beneficiary-
(1) if contributions are made to the trust by such employer, or employees or
both, for the purpose of distributing to such employees or their beneficiaries the
corpus and income of the fund accumulated by the trust in accordance with such plan;
(2) if under the trust instrument it is impossible, at any time prior to the satis-
faction of all liabilities with respect to employees and their beneficiaries under the
trust, for any part of the corpus or income to be (within the taxable year or thereafter)
used for, or diverted to, purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of his employees
or their beneficiaries;
(3) if the trust or two or more trusts, or the trust or trusts and annuity plan
or plans are designated by the employer as constituting parts of a plan intended to
qualify under this subsection which benefits either-
(A) 70 per centum or more of all the employees, or 80 per centum or more
of all the employees who are eligible to benefit under the plan if 70 per centum or
more of all the employees are eligible to benefit under the plan, excluding in each
case employees who have been employed not more than a minimum period prescribed
by the plan, not exceeding five years, employees whose customary employment is
for not more than twenty hours in any one week, and employees whose customary
employment is for not more than five months in any calendar year, or
(B) such employees as qualify under a classification set up by the employer
and found by the Commissioner not to be discriminatory in favor of employees who
are officers, shareholders, persons whose principal duties consist in supervising the
work of other employees, or highly compensated employees;
and
(4) if the contributions or benefits 'provided under the plan do not discriminate
in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, persons whose principal duties
consist in supervising the work of other employees, or highly compensated employees.
(5) A classification shall not be considered discriminatory within the meaning of
paragraphs (3) (B) or (4) of this subsection merely because it excludes employees
the whole of whose remuneration constitutes "wages" under section 1426 (a) (1)
(relating to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act) or merely because it is limited
to salaried or clerical employees. Neither shall a plan be considered discriminatory
within the meaning of such provisions merely because the contributions or benefits
of or on behalf of the employees under the plan bear a uniform relationship to the
total compensation, or the basic or regular rate of compensation, of such employees,
or merely because the contributions or benefits based on that part of an employee's
remuneration which is excluded from "wages" by section 1426 (a) (1) differ from
the contributions or benefits based on employee's remuneration not so excluded, or
differ because of any retirement benefits created under State or Federal law.
(6) A plan shall be considered as meeting the requirements of paragraph (3)
of this subsection during the whole of any taxable year of the plan if on one day in
each quarter it satisfied such requirements.
8. If a trust is involved, the income from the trust is also exempt. Over a period
of years, the tax savings on the trust income may be substantial, thus reflecting increased
benefits to the employees or a lower cost to the employer. P-If PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERV.
14012 <1951).
9. INT. REv. CODE § 165(b); §22(b) (2).
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retirement, or severance of service, a time when his tax rate is much
lower. Should the employee receive the employer contributions in a
lump sum from a trust10 in a single year, rather than periodic payments
because of termination of service with the employer, the benefit is taxed
at a reduced rate as a capital gain.11
Although the employer would be allowed a deduction for his con-
tributions to a non-qualified plan if they were immediately non-forfeit-
able, such contributions are taxable to the employee in the year
made.12 Where a large lump sum contribution is placed in the non-
qualified fund in a single year, the high immediate tax load on the highly
paid employee would largely subvert the basic purpose of the plan.
13
In this area'the tax-saving features of a qualified pension or profit-
sharing plan are particularly significant.
The public policy favoring industrial pension and profit-sharing
plans has long been recognized, and was expressed through favorable
congressional legislation as early as 1921.14 As the tax legislation has
evolved during the intervening years, the trend has been to encourage
the institution of plans through tax concessions, and at the same time
require these plans to meet standards which benefit the community and
the employees generally. In attaining this objective, a retirement plan
need not cover all employees of a particular employer-but merely
be designed to aid in solving the problems of superannuation among
its particular group of employees. By a wide adoption of plans accom-
plishing this objective, the cost to the federal, state, and local govern-
10. The long term capital gain treatment is not applicable to non-trusteed plans
(e.g., group annuity types). P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERv. 5305 (1951).
11. P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAm. SEv. 12031 et seq. (1951).
12. The terms non-forfeitable and fully vested are often used interchangeably. By
the use of the terms, it is meant that the accumulations made by the employer, and
standing to the credit of the employee, are fully and immediately vested in interest in
that employee. Most plans are not fully vested, but such employer contributions credited
to the employee are forfeited under certain circumstances, e.g., if the employee leaves
the employ of the company before reaching a certain age. In this case, since the plan
is of a forfeitable nature, it must qualify under § 165(a), for the contributions to
be deductible.
13. For a thorough treatment of this subject, see HALL, EFFECTS OF TAXATION-
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PLANS (1951); Goodfellow, Tax Consequences of Pension
Trusts and Employer Purchased Annuities to Employee or Beneficiary, 39 CALIF. L.
REv. 204 (1951). Where an organization is exempt from taxation under § 101 (6)
I.RC., employees do not have to include employer contributions when made to an
annuity plan which does not use a trust; whether or not the rights under the plan are
non-forfeitable. Such employees are subject to tax when the income is actually received.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(b) (2)-5 (1951); P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAIL SERV. ff 7021
(1951).
14. The 1921 Act made no mention of pension plans or trusts, but only of stock-bonus
and profit-sharing plans. It was not until 1926 that the legislation was extended to
pension plans.
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ments in caring for the constantly increasing portion of aged and de-
pendent population would be reduced and a stabilizing factor in the
nation's purchasing power created.15
The early enactments favoring deferred compensation systems were
found in Section 219(f) until the Revenue Act of 1928. To qualify as
a tax-exempt trust, four qualifications had to be met: (1) the plan had
to be for the exclusive benefit of some or all of the employees; (2)
contributions were required by the employer, employees, or both; (3)
the earnings and principal of the trust fund were to be distributed to
such employees; (4) the fund was to be accumulated in accordance with
a plan of which the trust was a part.
Prior to 1928, the deductions were taken under Section 23(a) as
ordinary and necessary business expense, and were allowed only for
current commitments accruing during the taxable year. Thus, no deduc-
tions were permitted for contributions to fund past service credits
nor for amounts necessary to make the pension plan actuarially sound
but in excess of pension requirements actually accruing during the year.
In 1928, two important changes were made. Section 219(f) became
Section 165, and Section 23(q) was adopted. Section 2 3(q), which
was later to become Section 23(p), made possible a deduction, to be
spread in equal amounts over ten years, for a reasonable contribution
in excess of the liability accruing during the current year. Thus, it
was possible to fund past service liability, create an actuarially sound
plan, and take a deduction for the amount so contributed. However,
to have deducted the excess above current commitments under 23(q),
the requirements of Section 165 must have been satisfied.
The Revenue Act of 1938 added a new requirement to Section
165 to the effect that the'trust must be irrevocable in the sense that
there should be no diversion of the funds prior to satisfaction of all
liabilities to employees under the trust. To Section 2 3 (p) (formerly
23(q) ) was added the qualification that the -prorated deduction
should be allowed only in taxable years during which the trust was
exempt under Section 165. Contributions to discharge the current pen-
sion liability, and all contributions to stock bonus and profit-sharing
plans were not deducted under 23(p) but continued until 1942 to be
deducted under 23(a) and thus were not subjected to the reqilirements
set out in Section 165.16
15. Freyburger, Pension Plans-The Philosophy of 165(a), 22 TAXES 60 (1944Y.
16. For a discussion of the earlier legislation affecting the tax status of pension,
profit-sharing and stock bonus plans, see CLARx, PROFIT SHARING AND PENSION PLANS-
LAW AND TAXES §§ 13, 62 (1946); P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERv. 15001 (1951).
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The Revenue Act of 1942 entirely rewrote Section 165 and Sec-
tion 2 3(p), with the dual objectives of preseiving the fundamental tax
advantages provided under earlier enactments and at the same time
blocking tax avoidance loopholes. Sweeping changes as to the number
of employees which must be covered and as to requirements for non-
discrimination were adopted. 17 Only plans which benefited large num-
bers of employees were to be given favorable tax treatment and those
covering only a few, favored, high-salaried employees or executives
should not qualify."" Thus, minimum coverage requirements Were
inserted into the law, with the added proviso that plans which do not
meet the minimum requirements may nevertheless be qualified if the
classification is found to be non-discriminatory by the Commissioner.
It was recognized, however, that such extended coverage alone would
be no guarantee that the trust was designed for the welfare of the
employees generally, in view of the possibility of manipulating the bene-
fits under the trust.19 Consequently, the statute requires the extension
of the benefits and contributions to be administered in a non-discrimina-
tory manner, to prevent the favoring of high-salaried employees. Sec-
tion 23(p) was greatly changed in that all contributions to all types
of plans must be deductible under this section in addition to being
required to meet the test of reasonable compensation under 23(a) .20
For the first time, all deferred compensation systems, to be deductible,
had to comply with the newly rigorous requirements of 165(a) for
qualification.2 1
For a plan to qualify under Section 165(a), the Commissioner
requires generally that it be a plan: (1) established for the exclusive
benefit of the employees or their beneficiaries, 22 (2) permanent and
definite,23  (3) written and communicated, 24  (4) by which it is
17. Considering the necessity for raising revenue, it might not have been surprising
if the Treasury had proposed and,Congress had enacted more stringent legislation. But
Congress, realizing the ever increasing importance of pension and profit-sharing plans,
continued to look upon them with favor. The Treasury, represented by Mr. Randolph
Paul, tax advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury, proposed more rigid standards in
two respects than were later adopted. The first of these was that the plans should be
fully vested, and the second was that contributions for pensions over $7,500 should not
receive the favorable tax treatment. See Hearings before. Committee on Ways and
Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2405 (1942).
18. Id. at 2406.
19. Ibid.
20. P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SEPV. 5001 (1951).
21. An exception to this will be found in non-qualified plans in which the interest
of the employee is non-forfeitable.
22. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1, as amended, T.D. 5422 (Dec. '13, 1944), P-H




impossible to divert the funds to any other purpose than for the benefit
of the participants or their beneficiaries, 2 and (5) that the plan shall
not discriminate in favor of officers, stockholders, highly paid, or super-
visory employees, either in coverage or contributions and benefits. 26
The 6th Circuit, in Lincoln Electric Company Employee's Profit-
Sharing Trust, Cleveland Trust Company, Trustee v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,2 7 has held the requirements invalid to the extent that
they deny tax-exempt status to a profit-sharing plan when there is but
one contribution. The Court, in overruling the Tax Court,28 said in
effect that "permanency" and "definite profit-sharing formula" were not
required by Section 165 (a) .29
In December, 1941, the Lincoln Electric Company established a
trust for the benefit of 890 of its employees, most of the company's
personnel, and paid $1,000,000 to the trustee for purposes of the trust.
There was no provision for future contributions to the trust, nor were
any made. The trust was to continue for a term of ten years, unless
distribution of all the benefits under its terms had been fully completed
prior to that time.30
25. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-2 (1943), P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERv. 119177
(1945).
26. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.165-3 (1943), P-H PENS & PROF. SHAR. SERv. 9178
(1943); U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-4, as amended, T.D. 5422 (Dec. 13, 1944), P-H
PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERv. [ 9179 (1945).
27. 190 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1951).
28. 14 T.C. 598 (1950).
29. In so finding, the circuit" court sided with three dissenting Tax Court judges
"with whose views [they] are in complete accord."
30. The right of Lincoln Electric to claim full tax deduction for the $1,000,000
contribution made in 1941 has not yet been settled after 10 yearg of bitter litigation.
The company claimed the deductions under Sec. 23(a) I.R.C. as an ordinary and
necessary expense or as compensation paid for personal service; or under Sec. 22(a)
I.R.C. as a part of the cost of goods sold.
The commissioner disallowed the deductions and his ruling was upheld by the Tax
Court. 6 T.C. 37 (1946).
The Company appealed to the circuit court of appeals, 162 F.2d 379 (6th Cir.
1947), which reversed the Tax Court and held that the contributions were ordinary and
necessary business expense.
Back in the Tax Court, the Commissioner argued that the court should decide the
question of reasonableness of the deduction, but the Tax Court held that it was without
power to decide that issue, because the circuit court had held that the contributions
were ordinary and necessary. T.C. Memo and Order (Oct. 27, 1947).
The Commissioner appealed this ruling, and was this time upheld by the circuit
court which held that it was the function of the Tax Court to determine whether or not
the amounts were reasonable; the element of reasonableness being inherent in the phrase
"ordinary and necessary." 176 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1949).
At this writing, the Tax Court has yet to determine the amount of deduction which
would be reasonable. The Supreme Court denied the Company's application for
certiorari. 338 U.S. 949 (1951). See P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAl. SERv. [ 1013 (1947);
ff 1019 (1947); ff 5016 (1951) ; Peters, Lhicoln Electric Co. Case, 4 MIAmI L.Q. 12
(1942); Comment, 49 MICx. L. REV. 395 (1951); Note, 45 ILL. L. REV. 295 (1950).
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The Commissioner determined a deficiency in income tax with
respect to the earnings of the trust for 1944. The question was whether
the employees' profit-sharing trust was tax-exempt within the meaning
of Section 165(a). The case is extremely significant. It involves the
tax-exempt status of a trust in 1944, after the important amendments
of 1942. Not only could it affect the necessity for "permanency" and
"definite profit-sharing formula" to qualify for tax exemption of earn-
ings on similar trusts already in existence, but, likewise it could affect
the requirements for original qualification of a plan under Section 165 (a),
so that the employer may deduct his contribution under Section 23 (p).31
Permanency of a Plan
Treasury regulations insist that a plan must be permanent "as dis-
tinguished from a temporary program".3 2  Although subject to dis-
qualification at any time, the Commissioner usually passes on the ques-
tion either when the plan is submitted for initial approval, or at the
time it is terminated. In the latter instance, disqualification would have
a retroactive effect in disallowing exempt status for all years in which
the plan did not qualify and upon which the statute of limitations had
not run.
33
Little basis for the requirement of permanency can be found in
the Code. As pointed out in the opinion in the Lincolu case, and
by the dissenting judges in the Tax Court, the statute requires only that
there be a "plan"." The Commissioner's insistence on permanency is
based on the desire to restrict the creation of plans during years of
high profits, principally to secure tax advantage, only to be abandoned
as profits decrease and when it no longer appears desirable from a tax
standpoint to continue payments.35 Doubtless, the Commissioner con-
siders that the provisions of the statute prescribing non-discrimination
and non-diversion of the funds furnish sufficient statutory basis for
requiring permanency.36  It is suggested, however, that the require-
31. Lincoln is seeking its original deduction under §23(a) I.R.C. Prior to the
Revenue Act of 1942, deductions for profit-sharing trusts, stock-bonus plans and
current pension liability (as distinguished from past service pension liability) were
made under §23(a). Thus, it was not necessary, under this section, to meet the
* requirements of § 165(a) I.R.C. to claim deduction. With the 1942 amendments, deduc-
tions for all profit-sharing, stock-bonus, and pension plans are deducted under § 23 (p)
* I.R.C.
32. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.165-1(a), as amended, T.D. 5422 (Dec. 13, 1944).
33. P-H PENs. & PROF. SHAR. Smv. 114214 (1951).
34. INT. REV. CODE § 165(a).
35. PS 7, dated July 29, 1944, P-H PFas. & PROF. SHAR. Saav. 119505 (1946).
36. CLARK, PROFIT SHAU NG AND PENSION PLANS-LAW A-N TAXFS § 35 (1946).
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ments of non-diversion and non-discrimination may be fully effectuated,
regardless of the permanency of the plan.3 7
The Commissioner will act on the presumption that the plan is
being created as a permanent program, unless there is clear evidence
to the contrary.38 While the employer may reserve the right to alter
or terminate the plan, its abandonment within a few years 9 for any
cause other than business necessity, will create a presumption that
the - plan at its inception was not intended to be permanent. 40  This
presumption may be rebutted by such facts as adverse business conditions
not within the control of the employer, 41 bankruptcy or insolvency,42
or unanticipated sale or transfer of the business. These conditions must
not have been 'reasonably foreseen. 43  There is little differentiation
between profit-sharing, pension, or stock bonus plans in this respect in
the rulings promulgated by the Commissioner, since the requirement of
permanency applies to all types of deferred compensation plans. 4
If permanency no longer be necessary, as suggested by the
Circuit Court, early termination would not in any way affect the non-
diversion subsection of the Code.45 The plan could be terminated at will,
but the proceeds previously contributed by the employer would be dis-
tributed among the employee participants or their beneficiaries.
Similarly, the Commissioner could greatly strengthen the anti-dis-
crimination requirements to prevent possible discrimination in favor of
officers, supervisory or highly compensated employees in the event that
37. "The probable intention of Congress in the use of the term [plan] was ...
merely to describe the general character of the arrangement in respect to which a trust
forming part thereof may qualify as tax exempt." CLARK, op. cit. supra note 36, at 118.
In contrast to the term "plan," Section 165 (a) sets out in some detail the requirements
of non-discrimination and non-diversion of the funds.
38. PS 52, dated Aug. 9, 1945, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERv. 9551 (1945).
39. It is not certain what is meant by a "few years." Since Mim. 5717, discussed
below, uses a 10 year period, the term might well be considered to mean 10 years or less.
40. See notes 32 and 38 supra.
41. See note 38 supra.
42. Ibid.
43. In one instance, the Tax Court held in favor of an employer who discontinued
his profit-sharing plan after it had been in operation only one year because the main
purpose of the plan as originally envisaged was found to be impossible of fulfillment.
Blume Knitwear, 9 T.C. 1179 (1947).
44. In order for the Commissioner not to disqualify a plan retroactively should it
be terminated, the plan must: (1) be spelled out in the written documents furnished the
Commissioner at its inception; (2) meet qualification requirements in other respects
during its operation; (3) have been intended to be permanent; and, (4) valid reasons
for termination must exist. Mim. 6136, dated Apr. 3, 1947, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR.
Smwv. ff 9271 (1947) ; 14?13 (1951).
45. It is required in § 165 (a) (2) I.R.C. that "at any time prior to the satisfaction
of all liabilities with respect to employees and their beneficiaries under the trust ... [it
shall be impossible] for any part of the corpus or income to be used for, or diverted
to, purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of . . . employees or their beneficiaries."
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the plan does not prove to be a permanent one. The possibility of dis-
crimination on early termination is more acute in a pension than in a
profit-sharing plan because pensions for the highly paid employees or
others, in favor of whom discrimination is prohibited under Section 165
(a), could be fully funded and then the plan abandoned. 46 To prevent this
possibility, the Commissioner has limited the amount of deductible em-
ployer contributions for the 25 highest-paid employees scheduled to re-
ceive pensions in excess of $1,500 a year when the plan goes into effect, in
the event that the plan is terminated or current costs are not met during
the first ten years following its establishment. 47 Any excess funds which
have been contributed by the employer would be distributed among other
employees, but so as not to discriminate in favor of the more highly
compensated employees. 48  This limitation has never been applied to
profit-sharing trusts, but there is no apparent reason why a similar rule
should not be promulgated.
While the safeguards provided by statute in Section 165 (a) may
be effectuated by proper exercise of the authority expressly found in
the statute, without the added requirement of permanency, the removal
of such a requirement is likely to give added momentum to the institution
of pension and profit-sharing plans. Thus, employers who have desired
to ifistall plans in past years, but have refused because of a hesitancy
to commit themselves to a permanent program, will be more inclined
to establish them. They would not face the possibility of having their
deductions retroactively denied, after having initially and year by year
seemingly met the qualification requirements. The burden of proving
"business necessity", as applied by the Commissioner, as a condition to
terminate or even amend has proved a deterrent to many employers. The
problem has been especially critical in the area of profit-sharing. Since
profit-sharing contributions are tied to earnings, the abandonment of
the plan is 'more difficult to justify.49
t
46. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1, as amended, T.D. 5422 (Dec. 13, 1944).
47. P-H PsS. & PROF. SHAR. SERV. 114211 (1951). The restrictions are contingent
and do not affect the plan so long as it is kept in operation and current costs are met.
Nor do the requirements have any bearing on deductions of contributions under § 23 (p)
I.R.C. However, should the plan be terminated within the prescribed period, the
maximum employer contributions which may be used for any employee within the
restricted group is limited to the greater of: (1) $20,000, or (2) an amount computed
by multiplying 20% of his annual compensation or $10,000, whichever less, by the number
of years since the establishment of the plan. There may be a possibility that a new
10 year period will begin to run if there is a change in the plan which might substantially
increase the possibility of discrimination. Mlm. 5717, dated July 13, 1944, P-H PENS. &
PROF. SHAR. SERV. 1 9548 (1950); 114224 (1951).
48. PS 8, dated Aug. 4, 1944, P-H PENS. & PROF. SEAR. Smv. 1f 9506 (1946).
49. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 36, at 123.
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The advantage gained by making pension and profit-sharing plans
more attractive to employers, thus assisting employees to solve their
economic problems, would seem to greatly outweigh the possibility that
not requiring permanency would induce the use of a plan as a tax
avoidance device. The maximum amounts which may be deducted each
year under Section 23 (p) are rigidly fixed and generally are not affected
by the duration of the plan.5
0
Moreover, pension plans are unavoidably bound to union collective
bargaining agreements. Pension benefits are now wages in the sense that
there is a legal duty to bargain concerning them.5 1 Insistence on perma-
nence is not consistent with this concept since there is likelihood of a
change in the plan whenever a new collective bargaining agreement is
negotiated. The Commissioner has recognized the problem, and, while
not discarding the permanency requirement, has indicated that he will
not prevent initial qualification under 165 (a) of the ordinary union nego-
tiated pension plan.52 In his first ruling it was stated that the plan
would be considered permanent, even though the union contract did not
require the employer to continue the plan beyond the contract term.
53
A subsequent ruling indicates the permanency requirement is met if there
is no provision in the union agreement or any collateral document which
requires that the plan be discontinued, or which shows an intent to'dis-
continue the plan at a definitely determinable time; and if there is some
showing (to the employees) of an intention to continue the plan on a
permanent basis. 54
If the union agreement or other document specifically provides that
the plan is to terminate at a definite date, the plan must cover only those
employees who could retire within that time.55  Only in this situation
could the permanency requirement not be invoked to bring about a retro-
50. If a pension plan is involved, it is assumed that the actuarial determination of
the yearly liability would be made on the basis that the plan would be permanent.
51. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB., 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949).
52. The problem is not likely to arise in case of a profit-sharing trust, but it would
seem that there should be no difficulty in applying the principle to that area as well.
53. PS 64, dated Nov. 9, 1950, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHa. SEv. 19563 (1950);
15021 (1951).
54. The employer still must obtain the approval of the Commissioner to terminate
or amend. Deductions might be retroactively disallowed, should the employer desire
to terminate the plan perhaps at the end of the collective bargaining contract, when the
union may no longer press for continuance of the plan. It is this possibility that is
likely to work the most serious hardship on the unwilling employer forced to install a
pension plan solely through union pressure.
55. PS 67, dated Apr. 26, 1951, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHa . SRv. ff 9566 (1951). Any
funds in excess of those required for liabilities to pensioners or those eligible to retire
at the time of termination may revert to the employer.
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active disallowance of deduction§. Therefore, an employer desiring to
avoid difficulty in securing approval for termination of a union nego-
tiated plan may seek to require that there be a definite termination date.
However, consideration should be given to the possibility that the advan-
tages of a plan with a definite termination date would not outweigh the
disadvantage of limiting the funding of pensions to only those who could
retire within the specified period.
This possible incentive to definiteness of termination frequently
could bring about a result opposite to the permanency which the Com-
mission is endeavoring to achieve. This inconsistency could possibly
be rationalized on the basis that permanency for its own sake is not
what is being sought by the Commissioner, and a plan with a short but
definite life could be justified under some circumstances.
Definiteness
Section 165(a) provides for deduction of contributions to
bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plans which provide for the distribu-
tion of the fund accumulated only to.employees or their beneficiaries.
In the case of a profit-sharing plan, the Commissioner has interpreted
the word "plan" to mean that there must be definite formulae for deter-
mining the profits to be shared and for the distribution of the funds
thus accumulated. 56 The Circuit Court in the Lincoln case held the
definite contribution formula requirement was not supported by the
statute.5
There are two principal rules governing profit-sharing formulae
which will adhere to the Commissioner's interpretation..
First, a profit-sharing formula must involve no discretion on the
part of the employer;58 and secondly, the amount contributed under
the formula should fluctuate with profits, but may be limited to a maxi-
mum per cent of the compensation of participants. 59 There is no limi-
tation on the amount of profits which a formula might share. However,
deductions for contributions would be limited by Section 23 (p) (1) (C) to
56. See note 32 supra. I.T. 3661, dated May 25, 1944, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR.
SixRv. 19226 (1950).
57. Lincoln Electric's profit-sharing plan provides for a definite destribution
formula. 'It would appear doubtful that the necessity for a distribution formula will
ever seriously be questioned.
58. PS 33, dated Sept. 20, 1944, P-H PENs. & PROF. SHA. SEav. 19531 (1945).
An example of an invalid formula would be one providing for a contribution of 50%
of net profits, less dividends on common stock as voted by the Board of Directors, or
less a contingency reserve as voted by the Board. PS 21, dated Aug. 29, 1944, P-H
PENS. & PROF. SHAm. Smv. 1 9519 (1945).
59. A formula which provided for a percentage of net profits, but limited contribu-
tions to a maximum of 15% of compensation of participants would be allowable. How-
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15% of compensation paid participating employees, plus possible carry-
over deductions in subsequent years. Nor will a formula be disallowed
because the percentage of profits to be contributed to the fund might
increase or decrease as profits vary. This flexible factor may be intro-
duced into the formula provided the percentage is definitely determined
by actual conditions, and does not depend on discretion. 60
In this regard, it is essential that the basic differences between
profit-sharing and a pension plan should be understood and maintained,,
because of the difference in deductions allowable under 23 (p). A profit-
sharing plan is one established by an employer to provide for participation
by his employees in his profits, and the funds thus accumulated are dis-
tributed after a fixed number of years, an attainment of a stated age, or
upon the occurrence of some event such as illness, death, retirement, dis-
ability, or severance of employment. A pension plan provides systematic-
ally for the payment of definitely determinable benefits over a period of
years, usually for life, after retirement. Retirement benefits are generally
measured by such factors as years of service and the wages or salaries
received by the employees. Neither the amount of benefits nor the contri-
butions to the pension fund is dependent on the employer's profits. If
either the benefits payable to the employee, or the required contributions
to provide the benefits can be determined actuarially, the plan is a pension
plan.6 1
Generally, larger tax exempt contributions may be made for a profit-
sharing plan than a pension plan. 62 Should the requirement of a definite
profit-sharing formula be removed, there would undoubtedly be a trend
toward a greater use of a profit-sharing plan to provide income at retire-
ment. However, in most organizations, the security provided the em-
ployee by. a fixed pension benefit should not be entirely lacking. It is
suggested that this measure of security plus the advantages of the profit-
sharing principle might well be achieved by designing a pension plan
with the benefits low enough that the fixed commitment would not be
unreasonable for the employer. In addition there would be a profit-
ever, if the plan provided that the maximum would be contributed regardless of profits,
the plan would not be a profit-sharing plan, but a pension plan. PS 24, dated Sept. 2,
1944, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAI. SERv. 19522 (1947). Examples of formulae provided
by the Commissioner are: (a) a specified percentage of annual profits, or (b) a specified
percentage of annual profits in excess of the sum of dividend commitments plus a fixed
amount. I.T. 3661, supra note 56.
60. PS 33, dated Sept. 20, 1944, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERv. 9531 (1945).
61. See note 32 supra. Benefits are not actuarially determinable if the funds arising
out of forfeitures are used to increase the sums standing to the credit of remaining
participants, instead of being used to reduce the amount of contributions to be made
by the employer.
62. INT. REV. CODE § 23(p).
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sharing trust into which the employer could, at his own discretion, place
funds to be used for retirement benefits. 6A3 By the use of this principle,
many firms unwilling to install a pension plan with its high fixed obliga-
tions could help provide for the retirement needs of their employees.
Employers could decide yearly what profits, if any, would be included.
In exceptionally good years, more willingness would be shown to make
large contributions to profit-sharing because of the knowledge that such
a liberal policy could be curtailed in years that the profits should be
directed into other channels. As in the case of the Lincoln Electric trust,
it would be logical to assume that some employers might be willing to
make a single large contribution with no intent of making any subse-
quent contributions.
In addition to the greatly increased flexibility, there would be other
significant inducements to the institution of profit-sharing plans. While
ways have been devised to avoid its full effects, many employers, even
though they might desire to share profits, have been reluctant to expose
the amount of profits to their, employees and the public to the extent
necessary in establishing a definite formula plan.
If such requirement should be no longer necessary, the fundamental
principle underlying profit-sharing would be completely reversed. Under
present regulations, profits must be shared in a mechanistic, automatic
manner which involves absolutely no management discretion. Should
the rule of the 6th Circuit be adopted, this insistence on non-discretion
would be replaced by complete discretion on the part of management
as to what profits are to be shared. Instantly, profit-sharing would be-
come more palatable to the employer. The protections afforded the
employee in the sole-benefit, non-discrimination, and non-diversion rules,
discussed below, would be unaffected by granting the employer this
prerogative.
The stand of the Commissioner could be justified on the basis
that in this area the possibility of the use of a profit-sharing plan as a
tax avoidance device is very acute. But, as was pointed out in the deci-
sion of the 6th Circuit, this argument is of little avail where the trust
is irrevocable, as is necessary under the non-diversion requirement. 64
It has been suggested also that definite agreement to contribute a
certain percentage of profits will produce greater employee acceptance
63. A profit-sharing plan, however, may not be actually used to meet the costs of
a pension plan. PS 37, dated Oct. 7, 1944, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SEov. 119535
(1945).
64. It becomes of even greater insignificance in the case of the "one-contribution
type" established by Lincoln Electric where the opportunity of deductions for contribu-
tions in other years of perhaps larger profits was surrendered. See note 27 supra.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of a profit-sharing plan. 65 However, it would seem that a discretionary
type plan will, if adequately explained, receive as high a percentage
of acceptance as one based on a definite contribution formula. If the
employee is confident that the employer is acting in good faith, the
presence or absence of a definite formula would have little significance
so far as the employee is concerned.
It would seem that the requirement of definiteness which the Com-
missioner applies to pension plans, i.e. that they be established and
maintained on an actuarially sound basis, should meet with very little
criticism. 66 However, many union negotiated plans cannot meet this
requirement. Contributions based on some factor other than the amount
of pensions to be provided, such as a fixed amount per employee or
a flat percentage of'the payroll, will not insure an actuarially sound
plan if the amount of pensions to be paid is also fixed.
6 7
Thus, the desire to qualify union negotiated pension plans conflicts
with the regulations governing qualification. The regulations were
adopted at a time when union negotiated plans were rare, and when
the principal need was to ferret out unsound plans established for a
limited group. This conflict was partially resolved by the Commissioner's
ruling that both the contributions and the benefits may be fixed in a
union negotiated plan, if the employer certifies that he has used reason-
able actuarial calculations.
6 8
Written and Communicated Plan
The regulations have defined the term "plan" to mean "a definite
written program and arrangement communicated to the employees."6 9
The requirement that the plan be written is to insure strict compliance
with the non-discrimination provisions. 70 If a trust is involved, it must
be a valid existing trust under the laws of the jurisdiction to which the
trust is subject. 7 1 Communication is not mqde necessary by the statute
and was not required by the regulations before 1938.72 The Commis-
sioner has not specified the nature of the communication required, or
65. SEN. REP. No. 610, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1939).
66. See note 32 supra.
67. An example would be where the employer vas required to contribute 25 cents per
ton to a pension fund, and at the same time the employees would be guaranteed $100.00
a month pensions. It should be evident that there is no correlation necessarily between
the benefits promised and the contributions.
68. PS 64, dated Nov. 9, 1950, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERv. 119563 (1950).
69. See note 32 supra.
70. CLARx, op. cit. mpra note 36, § 15.
71. MIm. 5985, dated Feb. 21, 1946, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHA. SERv. 9267 (1946).
72. Nor would a trust be invalid without it. However, communication may be
necessary in a group annuity plan where no trust is used. CLARK, op. cit. supra
note 36, § 17.
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when it must be made. As a practical matter, the employer should realize
the importance of communicating the plan to his employees, whether
or not this requirement of the regulation be valid. Contributions made
to a pension or profit-sharing plan will prove to be a good investment
only to the extent they are understood and appreciated by the employees.
Failure to disclose the plan to employees would be indicative of lack
of good faith on the part of the employer.
Exclusive Benefit Rule
Section 165 (a) provides for exemption of contributions to a trust
forming part of a plan of an employer "for the exclusive benefit of
his employee or their beneficiaries."" 3
The implementing regulations promulgated by the Commissioner
would seem to have the full support of the statute. A plan will not
qualify if designed as a subterfuge for the distribution of profits to
shareholders, even if other non-shareholding employees are included."4
Former employees may be included, or those in the armed forces or on
temporary leave. 75 Beneficiaries may include the employee's estate, de-
pendents, natural objects of the employee's bounty, or persons designated
by him to share in the benefits of the plan after his death.76 In no event
may the plan name the employer as beneficiary."" When a stock bonus
or profit-sharing plan is used td support a pension plan, the former is
not for the employee's sole benefit."8
The Commissioner has rather broadly construed the term "em-
ployee" to include officers, employed shareholders, 7  and even board
chairmen. 0  However, partners and individual entrepreneurs may not
participate, although they may create plans for their employees. 8 ' An
attorney who derives the major portion of his income from private prac-
73. See note 34 supra. The phrase "or their beneficiaries" was added by the 1942
amendments.
74. See note 32 supra.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. See P-H PENs. & PROF. SAR. SEav. 14161 (1950). An employee must be
given the right to name his own beneficiary. However, in the absence of any designation,
the plan may provide that the beneficiary will be designated in a certain order of priority,
such as wife, children, parents, etc.; but any such designation must be subject to change
by the employee. Any actual designation of a beneficiary by an advisory committee,
even after consultation with the employee would not meet the requirements of § 165
(a)I.R.C. PS 19, dated Aug. 29, 1944, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERV. ff9517 (1945).
78. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1, as amended, T.D. 5422 (Dec. 13, 1944) ; P-H
PENS. & PRoF. SiHA. SEy. 1 4035 (1951).
79. Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., 84 Ohio App. 442, 84 N.E.2d 508 (1948).
80. PS 23, dated Sept. 2, 1944, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHrAM. SEav. ff 9521 "(1947);
f14035 (1951).
81. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1, as amended, T.D. 5422 (Dec. 13, 1944).
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tice, over which the client who pays him the largest fee has no control,
is not an employee of that client.
s2
The employer who faces the prospect of contributing to a union
welfare plan should realize that his contribution may not qualify if
the plan is designed to benefit all of the union members, wherever
employed, and thus could not be considered a plan for the exclusive
benefit of the employees of the particular employer.
Non-diversion Rule
.As a corollary to the concept that a plan must be for the exclusive
benefit- of employees or their beneficiaries, Section 165(a) provides
that it must be "impossible, at any time prior to the satisfaction of all
liabilities with respect to employees and their beneficiaries under the
trust, for any part of the corpus or income to be (within the taxable
year or thereafter) used for, or diverted to, purposes other than for
the exclusive benefit of his employees or beneficiaries." ' 3 The primary
purpose of this provision is to prevent employers from making tax
exempt contributions in profitable years, only to retrieve them in less
remunerative years. 4
The regulations require that the trust instrument make impossible
any such diversion by operation or termination of the trust, revocation
or amendment, the happening of a contingency, or by any other means.,
Excluded are all objects or aims not solely designed for the proper
satisfaction of all liabilities to employees or their beneficiaries covered
by the trust.8 6 In actual practice, this means that the employer may
not retrieve any funds paid to the trustee."" There are two exceptions
to this rule: (1) an employer may reserve the right to recover any
balance due to "erroneous actuarial calculation;" however, this may
be recovered only at the termination of the trust, and only after all fixed
and contingent liabilities to employees are met; s s (2) an employer may
82. This does not necessarily mean that an attorney, to qualify as an employee,
must devote full time to the employer's business. As an attorney, however, the major
portion of his working time and services must be devoted to the interests of the employer
who controls and directs his activities in this respect. PS 15, dated Aug. 24, 1944, P-H
PENS. & PROF. SIAR. SERv. 1 9514 (1945).
83. INT. REv. CODE § 165(a)(2).
84. I.T. 6394, dated May 31, 1949, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAm SRvw 119274 (1950);
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 36, § 47.
85. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-2 (1943).
86. Ibid.
87. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK FOR PENSION PLANNING 54 (1949).
88. For example, if 1,000 employees are covered by a plan, and only 300 have
satisfied the eligibility requirements to receive a pension, a contingent obligation has
arisen toward the remaining 700. Until this is met, no excess resulting from actuarial
error could be recovered.
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insert a provision in the plan that will permit recovery of the contribution
in the event that such payment is not approved by the wage stabilization
authority.8 9
No specific limitations are provided in Section 165 (a) with respect
to investments of the trust fund. However, care must be taken to
assure that the funds are not improperly diverted by the borrowing of
trust funds by the employer, or investment in the employer's securities.
Where the trust funds are invested in stock or securities of the employer,
full disclosure must be made to the Commissioner of the reasons for
such investments and the .conditions under which they are made.90 The
lending of money by the trust to the employer would logically fall in
the same category.91
It would appear that the interpretations of the Commissioner in this
general area follow the mandates of the statute with one exception. Ap-
parently, the non-diversion rule prevents the employer from recovering
sums paid into the trust resulting from mathematical miscalculations,
errors in the calculation of profits under a profit-sharing plan, or
erroneous inclusion of individuals. It is suggested that this require-
ment is not demanded by the statute, and is very likely to work hardship
on the employer. Sums paid in error do not fairly constitute a part
of the corpus or income of the trust, and, therefore, a trust provision
allowing for their recovery should not prevent a plan from qualifying
under Section 165 (a) .92
Non-discrimination Ride
A second corollary to the "exclusive benefit rule," and probably the
heart of the qualification requirements, is that there must be no discrim-
ination "in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, persons
whose principal duties consist in supervising the work of other em-
ployees, or highly compensated employees." 93 The Commissioner is not
only interested in whether the plan is discriminatory on its face, but also
whether it could possibly be discriminatory in its operation. The non-
discrimination requirement may have major importance in two phases
of the pension designing problem; in eligibility or coverage and in
benefits and contributions.
To insure adequacy in eligibility or coverage, Section 165(a)
89. PS 68, dated July 3, 1951, P-H PENs. & PROF. SHrAR. SmEv. 19567 (1951).
Such a provision was also in effect during World War II, but was later revoked.
90. See note 81 sutpra; PS 49, dated June 16, 1945, P-H PENs. & PROF. SHAR. SERv.
119547 (1945).
91. P-H PENs. & PROF. SaAR. SERv. 14203 (1951).
92. CLAPx, op. cit. supr note 36,, § 47.
93. Ixr. REv. CODE § 165(a) (3) (B) ; § 165(a) (4).
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requires the satisfaction of either the "arbitrary requirement," or the
"non-discrimination requirement."
The arbitrary requirement, specifically provided for in the statute,9 4
is complied with if, after short-term and part-time employees have been
excluded, the plan actually covers at least 56% of the remaining em-
ployees. 95 This requirement refers to a percentage of all active employees,
including employees temporarily on leave or in the armed forces, if
such employees are eligible under the plan.96
Should a plan not satisfy the arbitrary requirement for coverage,
it may still qualify as a non-discriminatory plan." To do so, a plan
must cover those employees within a classification established by the
employer and found by the Commissioner to be non-discriminatory in
favor of officers and shareholders. Most plans fulfill the non-discrimina-
tion requirement in this manner, rather than by the arbitrary coverage
requirement, 8 since no specific percentage of employees need be covered.
There is little concrete information as to what types of coverage
requirements will be found discriminatory. The statute itself specifies
several classifications that, in themselves, will not discriminate; i. e., exclu-
sion of employees whose entire wages are covered by Social Security
(those earning under $3,600), or limitation of the plan to salaried or
clerical employees. 99 Other plans have been approved which were limited
to male employees, employees above a stated age (especially if there
is high turnover among the lower age group), employees not covered
in the collective bargaining agreement, or employees at a particular plant
or division.10 0 In most plans, a combination of eligibility requirements
are found, such as minimum and maximum age limitations and-a speci-
fied number of years of service with the company.1 1 In profit-sharing
plans, there is a possibility that the eligibility requirements may be dis-
criminatory if a large group, among whom there is a high rate of turn-
94. INT. REV. CODE § 165(a) (3) (A).
95. Specifically, the statute provides that 70% of all employees actually participate;
or 80% of all eligible employees participate providing that 70% of all employees are
eligible. To determine whether the plan meets this requirement, the term "all employees"
may exclude employees who have not been employed for a minimum period of time
specified in the plan (not exceeding five years), and part-time employees, whose custom-
ary employment is for not more than 20 hours in any one week, or whose customary
employment is for not more than 5 months in any one calendar year.
96. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, 29.165-3 (1943).
97. INT. REV. CODE § 165(a) (3) (B).
98. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK FOR PENSION PLANNING 55 (1949y.
99. INT. REV. CODE § 165(a) (5).
100. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK FOR PENSION PLANNING 55 (1949).
101. For an analysis of the eligibility requirements of a number of pension plans,
see BANKERS TRUST CoQuPANY, A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL RETIREMENT PLANS (1950).
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over, are permitted to participate, since forfeitures from this turnover
might then be reallocated to a select group. 10 2
For a plan to satisfy the requirements as to coverage, it must
qualify at least one day in each quarter of the taxable year. 0 3 If the
employer has more than one plan in operation, e.g., one for salaried and
another for wage-earning employees, these plans may be considered as
a unit for the purpose of testing coverage.' 0 4 If they fail to qualify
when considered together, individual plans may qualify separately. 0 5
As a practical matter, compliance with the coverage requirements
of the statute as interpreted by the Commissioner should not be overly
difficult. However, one serious problem has arisen in union negotiated
plans. Many employers find it difficult to meet the requirements as to
non-discrimination in coverage when dealing with specific unions within
a plant. Even more difficult is the establishment of a coverage that
will qualify if employers wish to exclude employees with whom they
may have to bargain collectively. The Commissioner's interpretation
and application of the -non-discrimination requirement to coverage was
developed before the prevalence of union negotiated plans. The statute
itself would seem to be sufficiently flexible in this regard to permit a
modification in the Commissioner's concepts of discrimination so as
to ease the situation. In such instances, the Commissioner might pro-
mulgate special rulings, freeing both the employer and union from being
hampered by the possibility that a plan covering only a particular group,
singled out through the realities of the collective bargaining process,
may not meet the coverage requirements.
Not only must a plan comply with the coverage requirements, but
in addition, there must be no discrimination as to contributions or
benefits.' 0 6 This statutory requirement would seem to grant the Com-
missioner the greatest *control over the tax exempt status of contribu-
tions. If any of the provisions of the plan could possibly operate in
a discriminatory manner in favor of officer, shareholder, or supervisory
employees as against other employees, either within or without the cover-
age of the plan, then the plan does not adhere to Section 165 (a).10 7
The non-discrimination rule applies to all considerations of pension
designing and profit-sharing. These generally may be categorized into
considerations of the time of payment of the benefits, the amount of
102. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 36, § 19.
103. INT. RFv. CoDE § 165 (a) (6).
104. See note 96 supra.
105. PS 27, dated Sept. 2, 1944, P-H PENS. & PROF. SUR. SaRv. 119525 (1945).
106. INT. REv. CODE § 165 (a) (4).
107. U.S, Treas. Reg. 111, & 29.165-4, as 4mended, T.1, 54?2 (Dec. 13, 1944).
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benefits to be paid, and the mode of funding the plan. Improper design-
ing in any of these general areas may render the plan discriminatory.
No attempt will be made to discuss all of the many rulings promulgated
by the Commissioner on non-discrimination, but it seems proper to con-
sider some of the more important.
The plan will not be discriminatory merely because the higher
paid employees receive larger benefits than lower paid ones, if the benefits
have a uniform relationship to the employee's regular income.' 0 ' Benefits
in a profit-sharing plan may vary according to a distribution formula
which takes into account years of service or similar factors. 10 9 Plans
may be contributory, but if the required contributions are so burden-
some as to make the plan acceptable to only the higher paid employees,
the plan will be discriminatory." 0
At one time, a Commissioner's ruling'i limited contributions on
behalf of stock-owning employees (those who owned or controlled more
than 10% of the stock, of a corporation) to not more than 30% of
the total contributions made on behalf of all participating employees." 2
The rule acted as a deterrent to establishing pension and profit-
sharing plans in small closely held corporations, which would likely
have a large percentage of stockholding employees. In the Voickening
case,11 3 the Tax Court overturned the 30% rule, holding it to be merely
a general factor to be considered with all of the circumstances. The
Commissioner did not appeal the decision, but instead acquiesced; thus,
in effect, revoking the rule."4 The removal of this rule should greatly
increase the interest in profit-sharing and pensions among smaller
corporations.
The statute provides that a plan shall not be discriminatory merely
because employees are excluded whose income is less than what consti-
tutes wages for purposes of Social Security. 115 Likewise, the plan
will not be discriminatory merely because the contributions or benefits
are larger for the income above what constitutes wages for Social
108. See note 99 supra. This permits higher paid employees to receive larger
benefits than lower paid 'ones. In a sense, this could be considered discriminatory, but
it is not the type of discrimination in which the commissioner has interested himself.
109. See note 107 supra.
110. See note 96 supra.
111. I.T. 3674; I.T. 3675; I.T. 3676; P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SEav. 19227, f'9228,
19229 (1950).
112. P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERV. 14071 (1951).
113. Volckening v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 723, (1949).
114. I.T. 4020, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERv. ff 9241 (1950).
115. INT. REv. CODE § 165(a) (5). This amount is now $3600, compared to the
former 3000,
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Security than for wages belqw that amount.110 These provisions were
included in the 1942 amendments to permit a plan, designed in good
faith to supplement Social Security benefits, to qualify as not being
discriminatory in favor of highly compensated employees., 7 However,
the Commissioner has ruled that a plan which excludes employees on the
basis of this low compensation, or which provides for higher benefits
on one part of the compensation than o. the other, will not qualify
unless it "integrates" with Social Security benefits.
A plan is said to be integrated with Social Security when the ratio
of federal payments and the pension plan benefit (if any) added together,
is to compensation no greater for highly paid than for the lower paid
employees. 118 Not only is the comparison made with those employees
who are covered by the private plan, but with those employees excluded
as well. 1 9 Because the federal benefit is fixed by law, limitation, if
any, must be made in the private pension plan.120
Where Social Security coverage is available, generally most
plans are designed as supplementary plans to take advantage of the
,already provided federal benefits.'-2 The advantage to the employer is
obvious; the cost of a plan is greatly reduced. However, the require-
ment that plans must integrate with Social Security has met with some
criticism. The requirement tends to enforce limitations on plans which
would be non-discriminatory under the general non-discrimination re-
quirements, for where employees making an income of less than a speci-
fied amount are excluded, the necessity for integration is likely to become
a limitation on the benefits of those employees who are included in a
116. INT. REv. CODE § 165(a) (5).
117. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1942) ; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1942).
118. P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SEav. 14062 (1951).
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid. The Commissioner has promulgated two rulings, the latter of which
applies to plans to be integrated under the recently amended Social Security laws. No
attempt will be made in this brief space to analyze the technical requirements set forth
in these two mimeographs. It should be said, however, that plans that integrate under
the earlier ruling are not required to fulfill the new tests. MIM. 5539, dated Nov. 15,
1943, P-H PEs. & PROF. SHAR. SERV. 1f 9256 (1947); Mim. 6641, dated May 3, 1951,
P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERv. 19277; 4081 (1951).
121. Generally this is accomplished by one of two means: (1) deductive or offset
method, where the amount received from Social Security is subtracted from the benefit
received from the company plan; or (2) the additive method, by which the Social
Security benefit is estimated and the pl~fn designed so that the employee will receive
an adequate retirement income when the company benefit and Social Security are added
together. In other words, when the integration takes place on the "input side" of the plan,
the additive method is being used, and when it takes place on the "output side"-the
deductive method is in operation. See STRONG, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IN OPERATION
51 (1950).
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non-discriminatory manner, rather than a method of preventing dis-
crimination.
There are no requirements that a ceiling be placed on benefits
under a plan, although this was suggested by the Treasury during the
hearings on the 1942 amendments to' the Revenue Code. However,
maximum benefits are often imposed in pension plans to reduce the
cost. Where small companies are concerned and a majority of the
persons to be covered are highly paid personnel, a maximum pension
benefit may be necessary to prevent discrimination in favor of such
employees.' 22
Neither the statute nor the rulings of the Commissioner require
that the benefits under the plan be fully vested to the credit of the
participants. - Such a requirement of full vesting was suggested by the
Treasury 123 but not included in the 1942 amendments. Obviously, the
greater the vesting and the fewer the years of service required for
vesting, the greater will be the cost of the plan. Despite this, the
majority of plans do provide for some benefits on termination of employ-
ment before retirement age. In contributory plans, almost without excep-
tion, there is a return of the employees' contributions, often with
interest.'124 A plan will be discriminatory if the forfeitures, which result
because of a lack of vesting, inure principally to the benefit of the
employees who are shareholders, officers, or highly paid employees,
or if the forfeitures revert to the employer on termination of the plan. 125
It is suggested that reservation of discretion in the administration
of the plan be avoided wherever possible. The Commissioner will gen-
erally fail to qualify a plan under the non-discrimination provision when
there is a reservation of discretion which can be used in a discriminatory
manner, i.e. to favor one employee over another in a similar situation. 26
However, it is entirely possible for a discretionary power to be per-
mitted in one plan and not in another because of the differences in the
plans and the factual situations involved.
Summary
It is difficult to forecast in advance the effect which the latest
Lincoln Electric decision will have on the field of pensions and profit-
sharing. It is possible that the Commissioner will petition the Supreme
122. P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SERv. 14131 (1951).
123. Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Reviston of 1942,
77th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2405 (1942).
124. BoycE, How To PLAN PENSIONS 62 (1950).
125. PS 22, dated Sept. 2, 1944, P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. Siav. f 9520 (1947).
126. P-H PENS. & PROF. SHAR. SE~v. 4181 (1951).
COMMENT
Court for a review of the lower court's decision. Unless the Supreme
Court adopts the view of the 6th Circuit, the Commissioner will not be
bound by the decision, even in the 6th Circuit.
12
It is suggested, however, that the Commissioner might well acquiesce
in the decision. The removal of the requirements of permanency and
definite profit-sharing formula would be within the spirit and letter of
Section 165(a). Once the possibility of discrimination has been elimi-
nated, there would seem to be no statutory authority for applying more
stringent requirements for the purposes of qualifying a plan. More limit-
ing requirements could be an attempt by the Commissioner to do adminis-
tratively that which he was denied by Congress in the Revenue Act of
1942. While, by the very nature of the subject with its countless indi-
vidual problems, it is necessary that the Commissioner be specifically
given great discretionary power, it becomes of the utmost importance
that the courts should critically review the requirements of the Commis-
sioner in light of the basic purpose of the statute.
127. P-H PENs. & PROF. SHARL SERv. 4212 (1951).
